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Executive Summary 
The way the political parties select their presidential candidates has changed dramatically over 
the course of the United States’ history. While candidates were originally selected by party 
leaders, the system has gradually become more inclusive. The voice of the average citizen was 
at first nonexistent, but now voters play a direct role in candidate selection. 
Still, more progress is needed. This report addresses the shortcomings of the parties’ primary 
processes and explores how the primaries can result in the selection of presidential nominees 
who are both the most representative of the electorate’s will and qualified to serve as the 
nation’s leader. 
A More Equitable Primary Calendar  
The calendar of presidential primary contests gives voters in states hosting the earliest 
presidential primaries and caucuses disproportionate influence in the selection of presidential 
nominees. The demographics of these early voting states are not representative of the country 
as a whole.  
We recommend a new approach to determining the order of presidential primaries. Our 
proposed calendar would begin with a day of voting on which one small state from each of the 
country’s four regions would cast its votes. Each of the subsequent weeks of voting would 
include states of varying sizes from different regions. To give as many voters as possible an 
opportunity to have a meaningful say, there would be a limit on the percent of delegates that 
could be at stake on any given day of voting. The announcement of when each state would hold 
its primary would not occur until the December preceding the primaries, which would prevent 
candidates from spending a disproportionate amount of time and money courting voters from 
early voting states.  
More Informative Primary Debates 
Primary debates should provide voters with information about candidates’ plans for the 
country. But debates in recent election cycles have fallen short of their potential. The events 
have often become media spectacles instead of substantive dialogues. Candidates’ 
performances are graded more based on style over substance, and most substantive aspects of 
debates are reduced to soundbites. Some topics receive disproportionate attention, leading to 
repetitive exchanges. Many debates involve so many candidates that it becomes impossible for 
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We propose removing television networks, which can be more interested in ratings than policy 
discussions, from the process of planning debates. Instead, the political parties should 
coordinate with the candidates to organize the debates. The pool of potential moderators 
should expand beyond news anchors and journalists to include other experts, such as 
historians. To encourage candidates to take less performative, more policy-focused approaches, 
there should not be in-person audiences. Additionally, candidates should be guaranteed set 
amounts of time to discuss their ideas.  
Eliminating Caucuses  
Caucuses are meetings where local political party members declare their support for their 
preferred presidential candidates. State political parties use different rules for caucuses, but 
caucuses typically involve participants advocating for their candidates to other caucus-goers 
and physically grouping together based on candidate preferences. While caucuses give some 
citizens a unique opportunity to engage in participatory democracy, they are difficult to 
administer and have several drawbacks, including flaws that make it hard for many citizens to 
participate. Attending a caucus is far more time consuming than casting a ballot in a primary, 
and the timing of caucuses—several hours on a given weeknight—creates challenges for people 
who have conflicting work, childcare, or other commitments. Caucuses also deprive participants 
of their ability to keep their candidate preferences secret. Accordingly, the political parties 
should eliminate caucuses and replace them with primary elections. 
Opening Primaries to Independent Voters  
A majority of states host presidential primaries, which permit voters to anonymously cast their 
votes at polling places or by mail. Some states permit all registered voters to vote in any 
presidential primary, while other states only permit individuals who have belonged a political 
party for a certain period of time to participate. The rules for who may participate in primaries 
substantially impact the representativeness of a state’s pool of primary voters. Primaries should 
be opened to permit participation by independent voters. Fully closed primaries, which only 
permit registered party members to participate, tend to lead to the selection of more partisan 
presidential nominees whose views may not represent the party as a whole.  
Ensuring Majority Support for Nominees 
In some cases, a presidential candidate receives their party’s nomination with only plurality 
support from primary voters. Such a candidate is not likely to adequately represent the views of 
party members. The parties should use ranked-choice voting, a method in which voters “rank” 
the candidates participating in an election to ensure that the prevailing candidate has secured a 
majority of votes in the primary. If at first no candidate secures a majority of the votes, the 
candidate who receives the fewest votes is eliminated from consideration. That candidate’s 
votes are then redistributed to the voters’ second-choice candidate. This process would 
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receives a party’s presidential nomination is supported, even if not as a first choice, by a 
majority of a party’s voters.  
Balancing the Input of Voters and Party Establishments 
“Peer review” is input by party leaders on who may become a party’s presidential nominee. A 
lack of peer review may lead to the selection of an unqualified candidate who is able to 
mobilize a large number of voters but who does not represent the party’s platform or political 
goals. One way the political parties can exert “peer review” is by permitting superdelegates—
unpledged, elected party elites—to participate in the selection of a presidential candidate at 
the parties’ national conventions. In 2019, the Democratic Party limited the role that 
superdelegates could play during its 2020 national convention, permitting superdelegates to 
influence the selection of their party’s candidate only if no candidate had secured a majority of 
delegates pledged through primaries and caucuses. We endorse this reform because it is an 
appropriate manner for party elites to promote the selection of a presidential candidate who is 
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Introduction 
A voter in Iowa misses her chance to caucus after getting out of work too late.1 A voter in New 
York chooses not to vote in her state’s primary, convinced that, so late in the primary calendar, 
her voice would not matter anyway.2 A voter sitting at home, unsure of who to vote for in her 
state’s upcoming primary, tunes in to the latest debate only to watch a media circus unfold as 
candidates fight to attract the most attention.3 These are only a few examples that illustrate the 
serious, consistent problems with the current system of presidential primaries and caucuses in 
the United States.  
The current primary calendar values the votes of some citizens over the votes of all citizens. 
States’ broad discretion to choose whether to host caucuses or primaries and whether to 
permit voters not registered to a major political party to participate in primary elections creates 
the potential for more problems. States mishandling their discretion on these issues can 
decrease voter turnout and create openings for politically extreme candidates to be nominated 
for the presidency. In some states, a candidate who has only received a plurality of the votes 
may prevail, giving the candidate a majority of the party’s delegates for a state, even though a 
majority of voters in the contest do not necessarily support that candidate. The current 
structure of primary debates often prevents informative exchanges on policy issues and 
sometimes favors well-known candidates over well-qualified candidates. Finally, elected party 
members play a controversial role in “peer reviewing” candidates, by endorsing and supporting 
certain presidential candidates. 
We recommend several reforms to the existing primary system aimed at ensuring that the 
system nominates the most representative and qualified candidates from each party. First, the 
primary calendar should be reformed so that no day of voting is so large it dwarfs other 
contests, and so that as many voters as possible can have a meaningful vote. Second, debates 
should be structured to be more informative for voters. Third, caucuses should be eliminated in 
favor of primaries. Fourth, state political parties should hold semi-open primaries that allow 
some voters who are not registered members of the parties to participate. Fifth, primary 
contests should use ranked-choice voting to ensure that candidates win by majorities, not 




1 Elaine Godfrey, Iowans Vote First, If They Can Vote at All, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/iowa-satellite-caucus-democrats-voting-rights/598999/.  
2 Matthew Schuerman, Why NY and NJ Voters Are Stuck With FOMO on the Presidential Primary, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 
27, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/why-ny-and-nj-voters-primary.  






5 Democracy Clinic 
 
greater weight than those of rank-and-file voters if a candidate does not secure a majority of 
delegates in the first vote at the national convention.  
This report begins with an overview of the primary system’s history before analyzing the 
system’s flaws and elaborating on our reform recommendations. 
I. History & Context 
The American presidential primary system evolved over centuries, from the framers’ vision for 
how the nation would choose presidents, to the creation of primaries and caucuses, to the shift 
following the 1968 Democratic National Convention, and finally to the modern system used in 
both the 2016 and 2020 presidential primaries.  
 The Founding Era 
After escaping the rule of King George III, the Constitution’s framers set about creating a new 
form of government, one in which the president would have far less power than a monarch.4 
The framers had not envisioned anything like the primary system the United States has today. 
In Federalist Papers Nos. 10 and 51, James Madison underscored both the importance of 
mediating popular democratic ideals through wise leaders and the necessity of limiting the 
power of government through internal competition.5 Written in 1787 and 1788 respectively, 
the Federalist Papers give insight into the rationale behind the framers’ decisions and suggest 
they would view the current primary system as too unmanaged, with the need for additional 
oversight that prevents the rise of unqualified demagogues, without taking too much decision 
making power from the electorate.6 
 Progressive Era 
Beginning in 1800, members of Congress would meet with their respective political parties to 
choose the parties’ presidential candidates.7 This process faced criticism for disrupting the 




4 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). 
5 Id. 
6 See id. 
7 See ROBERT E. DICLERICO & JAMES W. DAVIS, CHOOSING OUR CHOICES: DEBATING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS 4 
(2000). 
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By 1820, the flaws with this system became apparent.9 That year, the Federalist Party ceased to 
be a viable party and did not nominate a candidate for president, leaving Democratic-
Republican James Monroe to run unopposed for a second term.10 Even as the only remaining 
national party, the Democratic-Republicans faced challenges during the 1824 nominating 
process.11 The press, state legislatures, and politically involved citizens were tired of Congress 
having the sole power to select presidential nominees, and they protested the process as 
unconstitutional.12 The Democratic-Republican Party went to war with itself over the issue, 
effectively ending the Congressional Caucus era.13 
In 1832, the Party Conventions era began.14 During this period, the parties held national 
conventions that convened representatives of the parties from across the country to determine 
their nominees.15 This transferred the nomination power from members of Congress to state 
parties.16 
The states were not consistent in the way they chose their delegates for the conventions.17 In 
some states, the governor or a state party official appointed the delegates.18 Other states held 
local caucuses that chose representatives to send to county caucuses where caucus-goers 
would select delegates to the state caucus, which would then choose delegates to send to the 
national convention. No matter the method a state employed, delegates represented only their 
state, and were not bound to a particular candidate.19 
The parties intended national conventions to be a more open and democratic way to choose 
their nominees.20 However, as the 20th century began, many Americans became disillusioned 
with this manner of nomination.21 They saw the system as being rife with potential for 
manipulation by the parties and candidates.22  These sentiments created space for the 




9 See BARBARA NORRANDER, THE IMPERFECT PRIMARY: ODDITIES, BIASES, AND STRENGTHS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION 
POLITICS 11 (2d ed. 2015). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See William J. Morgan, The Decline of the Congressional Nominating Caucus, 24 TENN. HISTORICAL Q. 245, 250-51 
(1965). 
13 See id. at 253-54. 
14 See id. at 255. 
15 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 12. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id.; see also DICLERICO & DAVIS, supra note 7, at 5. 
19 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 12; see also DICLERICO & DAVIS, supra note 7, at 5. 
20 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
21 See DICLERICO & DAVIS, supra note 7, at 4-5. 
22 See id. at 5. 
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party leaders were skeptical of giving weight to voters’ preferences. They believed primaries 
were too expensive and that voter turnout was too low.24  
Despite party leaders’ hesitation, there was a shift toward more direct modes of voting in the 
primaries, but the parties still effectively controlled the selection of the majority of delegates to 
the conventions.25 States’ primary results were not binding on delegates, who were not 
required to vote for the candidate who won the state’s primary.26 The main purpose of 
primaries and caucuses in this era was to tell convention delegates about candidates’ popularity 
in the states that held the contests. 
 1968 Democratic Convention  
The familiar American presidential nominee selection process, in which voters’ preferences are 
given significant weight, only began after the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, Illinois. 
In 1968, Senator Eugene McCarthy, a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War, challenged President 
Lyndon B. Johnson in the New Hampshire Democratic Primary.27 McCarthy’s run prompted 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy to enter the race and, soon after, on March 31, 1968, President 
Johnson announced he would not seek re-election.28 His vice president, Hubert Humphrey, who 
was part of the political establishment many Americans had been protesting throughout the 
1960s, then declared his candidacy.29 While Kennedy and McCarthy participated in multiple 
primaries, Humphrey chose not to participate in any because he had inherited Johnson’s 
delegates. In fact, 25 percent of all delegates to the 1968 Democratic Convention had already 
been chosen in 1967 by Johnson supporters who automatically threw their support behind 
Humphrey when Johnson dropped out.30  
When Kennedy was assassinated after winning the California primary, the competition 
narrowed to only McCarthy and Humphrey.31 Party elites nominated Humphrey, who had not 




24 See id. at 5-6. 
25 See Stephen Gardbaum & Richard Pildes, Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of Selecting Candidates for 
Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 655-56 (2018). 
26 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
27 See ELAINE KAMARCK, PRIMARY POLITICS: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW AMERICA NOMINATES ITS PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATES 11-13 (3d ed. 2018). 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 13.  
30 Id. at 14. 
31 See Tim Arango, A Campaign, a Murder, a Legacy: Robert F. Kennedy’s California Story, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/us/robert-kennedy-california.html.  
32 David Hinckley, ‘Chicago 1968’ the Most Controversial Convention of Them All, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 21, 2008, 
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violent protests erupted outside the August 1968 Democratic Convention.33 The Democrats left 
the convention deeply divided, and Republican Richard Nixon won the presidency in a landslide 
that November.34 
During the convention, party officials, desperate for a peace offering to the protestors, had 
promised to create a reform commission to examine the party’s nominating process. The 
McGovern-Fraser Commission, led by South Dakota Senator George McGovern and Minneapolis 
Mayor Donald Fraser, conducted hearings and meetings throughout 1969 on how to transform 
the presidential nomination system.35 
The commission ultimately issued a report. The first part of the report mandated requirements 
for state parties because “[i]n at least twenty states, there were no (or inadequate) rules for 
the selection of Convention delegates, leaving the entire process to the discretion of a handful 
of party leaders.”36 These requirements included publicly notifying voters of how the delegate 
system works, eliminating the unit rule37 and proxy voting, and mandating procedural 
regularities in delegate selection across states.38 Most importantly, these procedural 
regularities included binding delegates to support whichever candidate won their respective 
state’s primary.39 The second part of the report listed suggestions for state parties that 
encouraged more diversity in both delegate selection and general election participation.40  
These reforms were adopted by the Democratic National Committee for the 1972 election 
cycle.41 In the Republican party, similar reforms occurred as a result of the Republican National 
Committee’s 1968 Committee on Delegates and Organization.42 Both parties’ reforms shifted 
the nominating power from the hands of party elites to the hands of the electorate.  
 Evolution of the Primary System In 2008, 2016, & 2020  
Since the reforms of the 1970s, it has become increasingly important for primary candidates to 
appeal and spread their messages directly to voters, not just to party leaders. During this time, 




33 1968 Democratic National Convention: A ‘Week of Hate’, BBC (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45226132. 
34 Id.  
35 See KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 13-14. 
36 117 CONG. REC. 32907, 32909 (1971). 
37 Id. at 32912 (“. . . a practice by which a majority of a meeting or delegation can bind a dissenting minority to vote 
in accordance with the wishes of the majority.”). 
38 Id. at 32914-15.  
39 Id.  
40 See id. at 32913. 
41 KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 14.  
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for presidential candidates to directly appeal to voters. All presidential candidates now have 
accounts on social media platforms, permitting them to directly communicate and engage with 
voters, who can passionately follow their preferred candidates and receive updates on the 
candidates’ activities and opinions in real time. Candidates’ strategic and candid use of social 
media to communicate with one another and voters has opened a pathway for insurgent 
presidential candidates who are not political insiders to gain and mobilize significant support. 
President Barack Obama’s use of social media and technology was critical in his successful 2008 
campaign.43 In fact, his direct communication with potential voters helped him gain popularity 
and defeat Hillary Clinton, a well-known establishment candidate, in a close primary race.44  
The 2016 presidential primaries and general election marked a notable shift toward rejecting 
established party figures and supporting outsider candidates, like Donald Trump and Bernie 
Sanders, who mobilized voters through direct and impassioned communication. During the 
2016 campaign, more voters read the social media posts of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
for updates about the election than visited their campaign websites or subscribed to receive 
emails from them.45 Trump received significant media attention for his inflammatory tweets.46 
Although Clinton’s campaign spent almost twice what Trump’s campaign spent throughout the 
2016 presidential primaries and general election, Trump’s barrage of unfiltered tweets earned 
him approximately $5 billion in free media coverage during the 2016 presidential election cycle, 
which helped him secure the Republican nomination and win the presidency.47  
In 2020, the strategic use of social media and technology continued to be important tools for 
candidates from outside the party establishment to gain momentum. For example, former 
Mayor of South Bend, Indiana, Pete Buttigieg, was relatively unknown to the American public 
prior to the 2020 primary. But “Mayor Pete” became popular on Twitter, earning support from 
many small donors, which helped him remain a viable candidate who was able to compete with 




43 See Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW RES. CENTER (Apr. 15, 2009), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/. 
44 See David Carr, How Obama Tapped Into Social Networks’ Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10carr.html. 
45 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ELECTION 2016: CAMPAIGNS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF NEWS 13 (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.journalism.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2016/07/PJ_2016.07.18_election-2016_FINAL.pdf.  
46 Amanda Hess, How Trump Wins Twitter, SLATE (Feb. 18, 2016, 1:04 PM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/donald-trump-is-the-best-at-twitter-heres-why.html. 
47 See Christopher Ingraham, Somebody Just Put a Price Tag on the 2016 Election. It’s a Doozy, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/14/somebody-just-put-a-price-tag-on-the-
2016-election-its-a-doozy/. 
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In sum, the American presidential primary system, once exclusive to party elites, has become 
highly nationalized and voter-centric. Outsider candidates now communicate directly and 
frequently with American voters, running increasingly successful campaigns that challenge well-
funded, established candidates. Despite these changes to a seemingly more democratic system, 
problems persist in modern primaries. 
II. Recommendations for Reform  
This Part presents our recommendations for (1) reorganizing the calendar for when states hold 
their primary contests; (2) improving primary debates; (3) ending caucuses; (4) allowing 
independent voters to participate in primaries; (5) implementing ranked-choice voting to 
ensure that candidates win majority support in primary elections; and (6) striking a balance 
between the input of voters and the party establishments in selecting nominees. 
 A More Equitable Primary Calendar  
The current primary calendar causes votes cast in early voting states to have more weight than 
votes cast later in the primary season.49 The first contests, which currently occur in Iowa, New 
Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina, dominate national media coverage for months50 and 
impact how voters nationwide think about the candidates. These four early states also narrow 
the field of candidates before voters in later states get the opportunity to cast their votes.51  
However, the four earliest states are not the only states where certain voters can have a 
disproportionately large influence on the selection of a presidential candidate.52 Recognizing 
the power of an early place in the calendar, some states have scheduled their primaries almost 
immediately after the first four states’ contests to maximize their voters’ influence. This 
phenomenon of “frontloading” leads to an enormous number of delegates being concentrated 
early in the process of selecting a presidential nominee.53  
To attain the impact they desire, frontloading states cluster together on voting days where 




49 Travis N. Ridout & Brandon Rottinghaus, The Importance of Being Early: Presidential Primary Front-Loading and 
the Impact of the Proposed Western Regional Primary, 41 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. 123, 123 (2008). 
50 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 117; John Haskell, Reforming Presidential Primaries: Three Steps for Improving 
the Campaign Environment, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 380, 384 (1996); Sam Reed & Deb Markowitz, No Way to Pick a 
President, RIPON F. (April-May 2007), https://www.riponsociety.org/article/no-way-to-pick-a-president-2/. 
51 See Wayne P. Steger, Andrew J. Dowdle & Randall E. Adkins, The New Hampshire Effect in Presidential 
Nominations, 57 POL. RES. Q. 375, 376 (2004).  
52 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 120-21. 
53 See id. at 121; KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 58. 
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delegates were at stake before the early-March Super Tuesday contests.55 On Super Tuesday 
2020, held only two days after the South Carolina primary, 34.1 percent of delegates were at 
stake.56 A massive number of delegates was at stake on a single day, yet the media and 
candidates had spent most of the prior months mostly focusing on Iowa, New Hampshire, 
Nevada, and South Carolina. Candidates needed strong showings in those first four states to be 
competitive in all of the 15 Super Tuesday contests. This dynamic requires candidates to raise 
considerable amounts of money before the primary season even begins in order to be 
competitive in the first four states.57  
The outsized importance of the first four states, which are not representative of the country’s 
diversity or of either party, may lead to candidates dropping out before they could realize 
success in other states.58 Iowa is 91 percent white, while New Hampshire is even less diverse, 
with a population that is 93 percent white.59 The demographics of the early states may skew 
which candidates remain in the race.60 And, as a result, a party’s eventual nominee may not be 
representative of his or her party, but merely of the populations of the states that scheduled 
their primaries at the start of the calendar.61 
Despite the large impact of frontloading, the primary calendar extends for many months.62 In 
2016, the calendar started with the Iowa Caucus on February 1 and stretched to June 14, when 
the Democratic primary took place in Washington, D.C.63 Some candidates had announced their 







55 See Democratic Delegate Rules, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Democratic_delegate_rules,_2020. 
56 Id. 
57 See Reed & Markowitz, supra note 50. 
58 See Dennis F. Thompson, The Primary Purpose of Presidential Primaries, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 205, 219-21 (2010); see 
also NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129. 
59 See Ian Milhiser, Why New Hampshire’s Primary Should Not Be the First Primary, in One Chart, VOX (Feb. 11, 
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/11/21134165/new-hampshire-not-first-one-chart-white-people. 
60 See Thompson, supra note 58, at 219-21; NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129; KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 56-57. 
61 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 121. 
62 See Alicia Parlapiano, How Presidential Campaigns Became Two-Year Marathons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/upshot/how-presidential-campaigns-became-two-year-marathons.html. 
63 See Election 2016 Calendar: Primaries and Caucuses, NPR (Feb. 17, 2016, 2:41 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/01/26/464430411/election-2016-calendar-primaries-and-caucuses. 
64 See Nick Corasaniti & Patrick Healy, Ted Cruz Becomes First Major Candidate to Announce Presidential Bid for 
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1. Existing Proposals  
There are several prominent existing proposals for reforming the primary calendar, including 
plans for a national primary, a rotating regional primary, and a system known as the Delaware 
Plan, where states would vote in order of their size, from smallest to largest.  
a) National Primary 
A national primary would involve every state holding both parties’ primaries on the same day.65 
This proposal would give each voter an equal opportunity to influence the selection of his or 
her party’s nominee.66 Additionally, all voters would be able to choose from the same slate of 
candidates because there would be no prior contests to eliminate contenders from the field.67 
Critics of this proposal argue that it would benefit the candidate with the most name 
recognition and deepest pockets.68 A national primary day would eliminate the opportunity for 
lesser-known candidates to build momentum with early wins.69 Campaigning toward a single 
contest would likely rely heavily on television and online advertising instead of retail politicking, 
which traditionally involves candidates interacting with individual voters and small groups.70 
Candidates would put their resources into the states with the most delegates, ignoring rural 
areas and smaller states during the campaign.71 Party leaders also fear that a large field of 
candidates in a national primary would allow a candidate to win the nomination with plurality 
support. A primary that ended with a nominee who did not come close to obtaining majority 





65 See Michael Abramson, Forget Iowa, Let’s Switch to a One-Day National Primary, WASH. EXAM’R (Feb. 18, 2020, 
12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/forget-iowa-lets-switch-to-a-one-day-national-
primary; NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 128. 
66 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 128. 
67 See id. at 129. 
68 See Caroline J. Tolbert, Amanda Keller & Todd Donovan, A Modified National Primary: State Losers and Support 
for Changing the Presidential Nominating Process, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 393, 397 (2010); see also NORRANDER, supra note 
9, at 129; Danielle Kurtzleben, No Way to Pick a President? Here Are 6 Other Ways to Do It, NPR (Jan. 26, 2016, 
2:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/01/26/463870736/no-way-to-pick-a-president-here-are-6-other-ways-to-do-
it. 
69 See Tolbert, Keller & Donovan, supra note 68, at 406-07; NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129. 
70 See Tolbert, Keller & Donovan, supra note 68, at 398; NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129; Heather Frederick, 
Reforming the Presidential Primary System: The Voter Turnout Initiative, 45 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. 51, 52 (2012); 
Kurtzleben, supra note 68.  
71 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129. 
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b) Regional Rotating Primary 
A rotating regional primary would split the country into four regions, with each region voting on 
the first Tuesday of every month from March until June.73 Some versions of the proposal would 
have Iowa and New Hampshire retain their positions at the start of the calendar before the 
regional primaries began.74 Proponents of a regional primary contend that confining campaigns 
to one region at a time would make them more manageable and could make prospective 
candidates more willing to run for president.75 Additionally, proponents suggest the system 
would allow candidates to bypass issues that are specific to very few states, such as the ethanol 
tax’s relevance in Iowa,76 and instead address only national and regional issues.77 
Although there may be environmental and convenience value in holding regional primaries, this 
proposal would probably do little to address the problems the current calendar poses. There is 
a clear advantage in voting early in the primary cycle, and giving one region the opportunity to 
vote first would disadvantage the others.78 This proposal would also hurt candidates who do 
not relate well to the voters in the first region, but who may have many supporters elsewhere 
in the country.79 Regional primaries would put a large number of delegates at stake on the first 
day of voting, which could result in a presumptive nominee without any other part of the 
country having an opportunity to weigh in.80 
c) Delaware Plan  
The Delaware Plan was proposed in 1999 by the Republican Party’s Advisory Commission on 
the Presidential Nominating Process.81 This plan groups states by population size and puts the 
smallest states, such as Delaware, on the first day of voting.82 That first day of voting would be 




73 See id. 
74 See id.; Kurtzleben, supra note 68; Steve Israel, Rotating Regional Primaries: A Grand Bargain to Save Iowa, HILL 
(Feb. 12, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/482685-rotating-regional-primaries-a-grand-
bargain-to-save-iowa. 
75 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 124; Caitlin Oprysko, Utah Governor Says Broken Primary Process Is Discarding 
the Best White House Candidates, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2020, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/07/utah-herbert-primaries-112186. 
76 See, e.g., Michael Grunwalk, How the 2020 Democrats Learned to Love Ethanol, POLITICO MAG. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/05/2020-democrats-ethanol-225517. 
77 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 124. 
78 See Kurtzleben, supra note 68. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 125-26; Kurtzleben, supra note 68. 
82 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 126; Scott Piroth, Selecting Presidential Nominees: The Evolution of the Current 
System and Prospects for Reform, 64 SOCIAL EDUC. 278, 283-84 (Sept. 2000).  
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gradually larger states would vote.84 The final group, which would include the largest states, 
would represent nearly 50 percent of all delegates at stake in the primaries.85 
Proponents of the Delaware Plan assert that allocating a majority of delegates to the last day of 
voting would prevent a presumptive nominee from emerging before voters in every state had 
had a chance to cast their ballots.86 This would allow most, if not all, voters to have a real say in 
choosing the nominee.87 Additionally, by letting the smaller states vote first, the plan would still 
allow for retail politicking, which permits the candidates with less money and name recognition 
to gain momentum and have a chance at the nomination.   
Critics contend that the plan does not prevent early states from having disproportionate 
influence.88 And granting small states outsized influence is made worse by the fact that they 
tend to be less diverse than larger states and the country as a whole.89 The Delaware Plan could 
create a two-step process, with candidates using the first step to concentrate on gaining early 
victories and momentum in the eyes of the media and then using the second to focus on 
accumulating delegates. These two steps would still allow the first states to vote to eliminate 
many of the candidates and give later states less of a choice.90 
2. Our Recommendation 
Our recommendation seeks to give the most citizens possible the opportunity to cast a 
meaningful vote, while giving all candidates the opportunity to introduce themselves to the 
electorate, gain momentum, and raise campaign funds. We recommend removing Iowa, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada as the first states to vote in the primaries. Instead, four 
states would vote on the first Tuesday in March, one from each region of the country 
(Northeast/Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, and West).91 Each state in this first group would be a 
“small state” with no more than 45 delegates in the Democratic primary and no more than 35 
delegates in the Republican primary.92  
On December 1, the national parties would hold separate lotteries to choose one state from 




84 See id.  
85 See id.  
86 See id.  
87 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 127. 
88 See id.; Kurtzleben, supra note 68; Piroth, supra note 82, at 284. 
89 See Kurtzleben, supra note 68. 
90 See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 127. 
91 See Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf (last visited Jul. 31, 2020). 
92 For the Democrats, there are four states from New England, five states from the Midwest, eight states from the 
West, and seven states from the South that would make up this group. For the Republicans, there are six states 
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chosen by each party would be different, the first day of voting would remain the same. A state 
chosen to vote first in a particular primary cycle could not vote first in a subsequent cycle until 
every “small state” from its region had been chosen to vote first. A few days after the 
December 1 lottery, the national parties would announce the rest of the primary schedule. Any 
state that attempted to change its dictated day of voting would not only have its delegates 
taken away, but would automatically be given the last day of voting in the next election cycle. 
When organizing the rest of the primary calendar, each national party would be able to 
schedule as many states on a given day as it wanted, up to a certain percentage of the total 
delegates at stake in the primaries. The national parties could choose to coordinate when 
states vote or construct their own schedules. In the second week, there could be up to 15 
percent of the total delegates at stake, the third week 15 percent, the fourth week 10 percent, 
the fifth week 15 percent, the sixth week 15 percent, the seventh week 15 percent, and the 
eighth week 25 percent. By the fifth week, up to 50 percent of delegates could be awarded. 
Although a nominee requires a majority, or over 50 percent of delegates, it is possible that an 
especially dominant candidate may secure the nomination on the fifth voting day. However, in 
a more competitive primary race there may not be a presumptive nominee until the final week 
of voting. 
The first day of voting would be the first Tuesday in March. There would be no primary the 
following week, but, after the one-week break, there would be a primary every Tuesday for the 
next four weeks. There would then be one week without a primary, followed by a primary every 
Tuesday for the next three weeks. The gap after the first day of voting would allow campaigns 
to regroup and capitalize on any momentum they gained, while ensuring that the voters in 
other states have their voices heard in short order. 
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Ohio (136), Washington (89), Florida (219), Indiana (82), West Virginia (28) 





Pennsylvania (186), New Jersey (126), Puerto Rico (51), Tennessee (64), Oregon 
(61), Missouri (68), Northern Mariana (6), Hawaii (24), Alabama (52), Iowa (41), 
Nevada (36), Oklahoma (37), Kansas (39), Kentucky (54) = 845 (21.2%) 
 
Our proposed reforms to the primary calendar are not without potential drawbacks, but the 
reforms would provide a substantial improvement on the current system. It is inevitable that 
the first states to vote will have an outsized effect on the primary, particularly because media 
coverage emphasizes the “horse race.” However, changing the states that go first in each 
primary cycle allows for different voters to set off the beginning phase of the primaries. 
Currently, Iowa and New Hampshire dominate the news for months, making it only natural that 
candidates who are more attractive to voters in those states seem more viable to the whole 
country. This recommended calendar may also change the way the media tracks the race, by 
hypothetically having eight different states vote on the same day (if Republicans and Democrats 
drew completely different states), the media could no longer highlight one state as a 
“kingmaker.” Using December 1, which is approximately three months before the first primary 
date, as the date to announce which four states will vote first prevents campaigns from having 
boots on the ground in the first states months or years in advance. This delay would help lesser-
known and lesser-funded candidates be more competitive. This delayed announcement also 
might reign in the disproportionate amount of money candidates spend in the first few states, 
and allow for spending to be distributed among more states. The announcement date may not 
stop candidates from declaring their candidacies as early as they do now, but it may encourage 
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first states. Some may contend that three months is too quick for states to set-up their 
elections. But the states that qualify to vote first would know that they could be chosen and 
could prepare accordingly.  
Larger states may object that smaller states would still vote first. However, for the field to 
consist of more than just the well-known or well-funded candidates, there should be an 
opportunity for “retail politics.” Connecting and interacting with individual voters is less 
expensive and more easily achievable in a small state. Little known and less well-funded 
candidates would be at a significant disadvantage in the larger states where support is gained 
more through advertising and large rallies than individual interactions. The proposed calendar 
preserves opportunities for candidates to interact directly with voters while allowing different 
regions of the country to be represented on the first voting day.  
The lack of diversity in many small states is a significant drawback of starting the primary 
calendar with those states. But that flaw is partially addressed by limiting the percentage of 
delegates at stake on each primary day, which helps encourage campaigns to appeal to diverse 
groups of voters. This also ensures the primary is not over before the majority of voters have a 
chance to cast a meaningful vote. The national parties could choose different kinds of states to 
reach the maximum percentage allocated per day in order to get a diverse and balanced 
contest.  
The proposed schedule could face criticism for being too fast paced. Although our proposed 
calendar ends earlier than the current calendar, it may delay having a presumptive nominee 
until later in the cycle, which could be precarious for a party facing a powerful incumbent. A 
longer wait for a presumptive nominee could limit time for fundraising and consolidating 
support behind the nominee. But allowing more voters to have a meaningful say in choosing 
the nominee should result in a candidate who voters across the country can enthusiastically 
rally behind and support financially.  
 More Informative Primary Debates 
The numerous debates between candidates for their parties’ presidential nominations often fail 
to live up to their potential for informing voters. The debates are typically organized through 
collaborations between television networks and the political parties. Federal Election 
Commission regulations dictate only structural aspects of presidential debates. For example, 
only non-profit organizations or broadcasters that are not controlled by a political party, 
political committee, or candidate can host debates and dictate polling criteria the candidates 
must meet to participate.93 But the apparent purpose of these rules—encouraging neutrality—
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debates have become counterproductive to furthering the goal of nominating representative 
and qualified candidates.94  
Criticism of the current debate structure includes disapproval of “mass debates” with so many 
candidates that each only has minutes to make their case to voters;95 the networks’ priority of 
attracting viewers, not informing voters;96 and questioning that rapidly jumps through topics 
and gives disproportionate attention to certain topics.97 The focus on performance over 
substance makes it hard for voters to understand candidates’ positions.98 The use of polling to 
determine which candidates qualify to participate in the debates is also detrimental. 
Candidates’ standing in polls can be influenced by name recognition, which can come from 
involvement in debates. The relationship between polling success and debate participation can 
create a cycle where qualified candidates are consistently excluded in favor of those who 
deliver the highest ratings.99 
1. Existing Proposals 
Multiple proposals already exist to reform the primary debates. First, to address criticisms that 
debates are geared more toward being entertaining than informative, proposals call for 
replacing celebrity news anchors with ordinary citizens100 or eliminating large audiences.101 
Audiences, critics assert, incentivize candidates to “grandstand and ignore moderators, while 
encouraging the journalists to cover the audience’s reaction more than what the candidates are 
saying.”102 To address criticism that debates do not give candidates enough time to respond to 
a multitude of questions on a wide array of subjects, proposals call for allowing candidates to 




94 See Bob Bauer, A Debatable Role in the Process: Political Parties and the Candidate Debates in the Presidential 
Nominating Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 615 (2018).  
95 Andrew Langer, How to Reform Our Flawed System of Presidential Debates, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2019/01/31/how_to_reform_our_flawed_system_of_presidential_deba
tes_111021.html.  
96 Walter Shapiro, How to Fix the Primary Debates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-fix-primary-debates.  
97 See Dovere, supra note 3 (“Several topics, such as health care, have been picked over repeatedly, while others, 
including the economy, haven’t been touch on much at all.”).  
98 See id. 
99 See generally id.  
100 Frederick C. Harris, Let Citizens, Not Celebrity Journalists, Ask the Questions at Debates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/10/13/how-to-reform-the-presidential-debates/let-
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101 Keena Lipsitz, An Intimate Conversation Is the Best Presidential Debate Format, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015, 7:04 
AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/10/13/how-to-reform-the-presidential-debates/an-
intimate-conversation-is-the-best-presidential-debate-format.  
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2. Our Recommendation 
Drawing on these existing proposals, we recommend overhauling the debates to make them 
informative and substantive events during which candidates explain their platforms in detail. 
The focus by networks and candidates on soundbites and performance allows fringe candidates 
to attract significant support without engaging in serious policy discussions.  
The debates should be planned by political parties in conjunction with candidates, instead of 
television networks, because the event is, after all, an opportunity for candidates to spread 
their messages. Networks too often seem more interested in achieving high ratings than 
fostering substantive policy discussions. Without networks producing the debates, the pool of 
moderators could expand beyond journalists to other credible experts, such as historians, as 
the Annenberg Working Group on Presidential Campaign Debate Reform suggested.104 
Access to debates for viewers should be expanded to allow as many Americans as possible to 
watch, both during and after the broadcasts. If the rights to debates were not owned by 
networks, the broadcasts could be viewed on a universally accessible online feed. Organizers 
could also post clips of important discussions of policy proposals by candidates once a debate is 
over, another recommendation from the Annenberg Working Group.105  
Debates should be structured with the same audience-less format as the March 2020 debate 
between Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders. Voters’ takeaways from a debate without audiences is 
determined “less by how the candidates performed and more by what they said.”106 
Candidates’ time for answers should be controlled by the “Chess Clock” model, in which they 
would have a set amount of speaking time to allocate however they choose. This model would 
allow candidates to go into greater detail on policy issues that are important to them.107 
We recommend maintaining polling requirements as part of the criteria for candidates to 
qualify for participation in debates. Given that the number of primary candidates in both 
parties has swelled in recent cycles, there is a need to keep the number of candidates on 
debate stages manageable. Polling requirements are the best way to keep debates focused on 
the most viable candidates. The proposed debate format would highlight qualified candidates 




104 ANNENBERG WORKING GRP. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN DEBATE REFORM, ANNENBERG PUB. POL. CTR. U. PA., DEMOCRATIZING 
THE DEBATES 13-14 (2015), https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Democratizing-The-
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105 Id. at 18. 
106 Fred Kaplan, Keep Audiences Out of Debates—Forever, SLATE (Mar. 16, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2020/03/debate-audience-coronavirus-biden-sanders.html.  
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 Eliminating Caucuses  
The political parties should eliminate caucuses because they are difficult to administer and 
create hurdles to citizen participation. State political parties currently have a choice between 
hosting caucuses or primaries to award their states’ delegates. Caucuses are local meetings 
where registered party members declare their support for their chosen candidates.108 Caucuses 
do not always follow the same rules. The 2020 Iowa caucuses illustrate the divergent 
approaches that state political parties can take. Republican caucus-goers simply wrote their 
choices on ballots, while the Democratic contest used a far more complex process. At each 
caucus site, Democratic caucus-goers gathered in groups based on their chosen candidates. If a 
candidate did not attract the support of 15 percent of the caucus-goers at a given location, that 
candidates’ supporters were allowed to join a different candidates’ group of supporters. All 
candidates who exceeded 15 percent support were awarded delegates based on a formula.109 
Proponents of caucuses hail caucuses’ uniquely democratic nature because supporters can 
directly advocate for their candidates and share their political opinions with fellow caucus-
goers.110 Critics argue that caucuses are undemocratic because they eliminate anonymity, 
potentially putting voters at risk of manipulation; they are inconveniently timed for those who 
have work or childcare obligations that prevent them from taking part in the contests that can 
sometimes last for hours; they might exclude certain religious observers when held on 
weekends; and they favor highly motivated voters, potentially encouraging candidates to take 
more-extreme positions to appeal to these voters.111 Additionally, if voters are even one minute 
late to a caucus, they might be disenfranchised.112 Turn-out is generally lower in caucuses than 
in primaries for these reasons.113 There are logistical issues with how votes are counted under 
certain caucus rules. When delegates are divided among multiple candidates, equations to 
determine that division may lead to candidates who attract the support of many more caucus-
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1. Existing Proposals 
Supporters of caucuses propose introducing virtual caucuses to allow those who are unable to 
attend in person to cast their vote by phone or app.115 The Iowa Democratic Party advanced a 
plan for remote participation before the 2020 caucuses, hoping it would make the caucuses 
more accessible and inclusive by allowing citizens who were not physically present in Iowa or 
who had conflicting commitments to still cast ballots.116 Critics of the proposal asserted that it 
was overly complex. They also took issue with a rule that capped the weight of remote votes at 
ten percent of the overall votes in the caucuses, regardless of how many people participated 
remotely.117 Regardless, the Democratic National Party rejected this proposal for 
implementation in the 2020 Iowa caucus due to security concerns.118 
2. Our Recommendation: Eliminate Caucuses 
We recommend eliminating caucuses in favor of primaries. The benefits of shifting to primaries 
in the few states that still hold caucuses is clear; primaries allow for far greater participation 
among a more diverse range of citizens and they are less prone to administrative mishaps, such 
as those seen in Iowa in 2020.119 
The political parties should take it upon themselves to eliminate caucuses because there are 
potential constitutional objections to laws banning the contests. The Supreme Court has held 
that the right to associate under the First and Fourteenth Amendments extends to political 
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California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Court held that any burden on political parties’ right to 
associate must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”121  
But there are plausible arguments that caucuses present constitutional problems. For example, 
Heather R. Abraham argues that caucuses violate the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth 
Amendments.122 First, she asserts that “the associational rights of voters outweigh those of 
party associational rights.” Second, she argues “caucuses may violate the equal protection 
doctrine by allocating unequal weight to votes.” Because arbitrary discrimination can 
unintentionally “[target] a suspect class” and attendance is mandatory at caucuses, there is a 
risk of excluding persons based on “factors like wealth, health, and geography,” which might 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.123 As the Supreme Court stated 
in Bush v. Gore, “It must be remembered that the right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly 
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”124 Third, Abraham observes that the financial 
burdens of caucuses may constitute a poll tax,” which would violate the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment.125 Legal challenges to political parties’ methods for appointing delegates are not 
foreclosed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bachur v. Democratic National Party, left the 
door open to such challenges, despite political parties’ associational rights.126 
 Opening Primaries to Independent Voters 
Whether independent voters may participate in a political party’s presidential primary or 
caucus affects how representative a party’s presidential nominee is of constituents. Fully closed 
presidential primaries, in which participation is limited to party members, are “skewed to the 
parties’ base constituencies,” and often lead to the selection of more partisan presidential 
nominees who may be less representative of the party as a whole.127 If independent voters play 
no role in the selection of a party’s presidential nominee, it is unlikely that the presidential 
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1. Existing Proposals  
In February 2020, Republican state representatives from Missouri and South Carolina suggested 
that the states “close” their presidential primaries to prevent “voting raiding.” They wanted to 
prevent Republican voters who felt confident that Trump would become the Republican Party’s 
presidential nominee from casting votes in Democratic primary contests aimed at having the 
Democrats select a weaker nominee.128 The bill proposed in South Carolina would have limited 
voters’ ability to switch party registration, permitting them to shift it no more than once every 
two years.129 
2. Our Recommendation: Permit Independents and Party Members to Vote in 
Primaries 
Although proposals to reform presidential primaries should take the possibility of vote raiding 
into consideration, closing presidential primaries entirely to independent voters may lead to 
the selection of extremely partisan presidential nominees. Additionally, voters may have many 
valid reasons for shifting their party membership, and it would be undemocratic and unjust to 
prevent voters from shifting their party registration at will. 
Presidential primaries should be opened, in some capacity, to independent voters for a number 
of reasons. Presidential primaries and caucuses that permit some participation by independent 
voters increase voter turnout.130 In states in which independent voters were permitted to 
participate in the primaries and caucuses held by both political parties, the average voter 
turnout was 38 percent.131 In contrast, in states that held fully closed primaries and caucuses, 
the average voter turnout was 18 percent.132 Furthermore, only approximately half of young 
voters (aged 18 to 24) register to join either major political party; the rest choose to remain 
politically independent.133 States that permit independents to vote in primaries are more likely 
to select presidential candidates who address policy issues that affect voters of various ages 
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Some states prefer closed primaries and caucuses to prevent vote raiding.134 But if primaries 
are opened to independent voters, state political parties have legal authority to take steps to 
lower the risk of vote raiding. In the Supreme Court’s decision in California Democratic Party v. 
Jones, Justice Scalia reasoned that vote raiding poses a “clear and present danger” in 
presidential primaries and leads to the selection of candidates whose views “diverge from 
those of the party faithful.”135 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia cited a survey of voters 
in California’s blanket primary, which indicated that 37 percent of Republicans planned to vote 
in the state’s Democratic gubernatorial primary and 20 percent of Democratic voters planned 
to vote in the state’s Republican Senate primary.136 In 1997, two professors at University of 
California, Riverside, published a study analyzing exit polls to determine how many voters who 
self-identified with one political party “crossed over” to vote in the other political party’s 
primary.137 Their study suggested that, in states holding closed presidential primaries, only 
approximately two to three percent of voters voting in one party’s primary in states holding 
closed presidential primaries identified themselves with the other political party.138  
Vote raiding is difficult to study because voters who cross over to the other party’s primary to 
choose a weak candidate are unlikely to admit what they are doing to researchers. 
Furthermore, politicians, celebrities, or influential party members may attempt to mobilize 
vote-raiding movements on a large scale in future presidential primaries.139 States, therefore, 
remain concerned about vote raiding and should pass delayed enrollment statutes to prevent 
vote-raiding.  
In 1973, in Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Supreme Court upheld N.Y. Election Law § 186, New York 
State’s delayed enrollment statute.140 Section 186 required voters to register to a party at least 
30 days before the general election that preceded the primary in which the voter wished to 
vote.141 The Court noted that because the deadline required voters to register to join a political 
party before the preceding general election, it was unlikely that the voters would have the 
“foresight” to join a political party to engage in vote raiding in a primary that could be a long 
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The Court held that § 186 did not constitute an unconstitutional burden on voters’ freedom of 
association.143 Requiring a delayed enrollment period was permissible because it furthered an 
important state goal, inhibiting party “raiding,” and placing a delayed enrollment deadline after 
the preceding general election would fail to have the same deterrent effect on party raiding.144 
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that, under their First 
Amendment right to associate, political parties may open state and federal primaries to 
independent voters.145 The Court recognized that it is in a party’s interest to “appeal to the 
independent voter” and that permitting independent voters to participate in a presidential 
primary will increase the likelihood that the primaries “produce the candidate and platform 
most likely to achieve that goal.”146   
In Storer v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld California Elections Code § 6830(d), a provision 
that prevented independent candidates in state and federal elections from being included on 
ballots if the independent candidate had been affiliated with a political party “within one year 
prior to the immediately preceding primary election.”147 The Court, citing Rosario, held that 
California Elections Code § 6830(d) “protects the direct primary process” and the “one-year 
disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system.”148 
Although Storer directly impacts the rights of independent candidates, and not independent 
primary voters, the Court’s holding nonetheless suggests that the Court will give broad 
discretion to political parties to regulate or limit the rights of independents seeking to 
participate in and affiliate or disaffiliate with them at will. 
A similar party disaffiliation requirement should be imposed for voters in primaries, permitting 
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either major political party since the preceding general election (a period of between four and 
seven months, depending on when in the primary calendar a state is holding its primary). 
Requiring a period of party disaffiliation for independent voters who wish to participate in a 
primary may limit the impact of vote raiding because it is unlikely that voters would be planning 
to vote for one party in the general election while simultaneously planning to raid another 
party’s election the following year. This independent voter disaffiliation requirement should be 
coupled with a delayed enrollment deadline, requiring all voters to register to join a political 
party no less than ten weeks prior to a state’s primary. Vote raiding may even be limited in 
years in which there is an incumbent president, because voters will likely still want to vote for 
other “down-ballot” candidates. As the Supreme Court noted in Tashjian, a party’s decision to 
permit independent voters to participate in presidential primaries provides the party with a 
“substantial benefit . . . in seeking to choose successful candidates.”149  
 Ensuring Majority Support for Nominees 
Were a candidate to win a primary election without winning a majority of votes, it could lead to 
the nomination of a less representative and less popular candidate than could be otherwise 
selected.150 A candidate might win a primary without the support of most of the electorate due 
to vote splitting, a phenomenon where having multiple ideologically similar candidates running 
can decrease the chances of any of them winning.  
1. Our Recommendation  
The political parties should implement ranked-choice voting (“RCV”) in the primaries. RCV, and 
more specifically, instant runoff voting (“IRV”), is a system in which voters pick their first-choice 
candidate and then can rank other candidates in order of their preferences. If a candidate 
receives more than half of the first choices, that candidate wins. If there is no majority winner 
after counting first choices, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and voters 
who picked that candidate as their first choice will have their votes count for their next choice. 
This process continues until a candidate wins with more than half of the votes.151 An IRV ballot 
would look like the below example, with voters filling in up to five bubbles in preference order, 
filling in at most one per column. In our recommended IRV model, when a candidate receives 
50 percent of votes in a given district, he or she wins that district. And if no candidate receives 
50 percent of the vote, candidates with the least votes, who would be mathematically unable 
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candidate as their first choice go to those voters’ second choice candidate. This process 
continues until a winner eventually emerges. 
Sample Primary Election Ballot 
Rank up to 5 candidates in the order of your preference. Mark no more than 1 oval in each 
column. 
 1st 2nd  3rd 4th 5th 
Candidate 1 ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ 
Candidate 2 ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ 
Candidate 3 ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ 
Candidate 4 ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ 
Candidate 5 ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ ⬭ 
 
Usually when IRV is implemented, the winner would have also won in a plurality voting system, 
receiving more than 50 percent of first choice votes; other times IRV leads to a different winner 
from the winner who would have been selected by the plurality system. In cases where IRV 
would result in a different winner, the winner ends up being a more representative, less 
polarizing candidate. In these cases, IRV leads to the victory of a candidate who ends up 
receiving a majority vote, when the plurality candidate would not have. That is what happened 
in the 1990 Irish presidential election, which Mary Robinson won with 38.9 percent of the vote, 
when Brian Lenihan received 44.1 percent and Austin Currie received 17 percent.152  
Critics raise concerns about voter confusion, and question whether voters can sufficiently 
understand how IRV works. Another criticism of IRV is that it could lead to the least popular 
candidate winning. This seemingly hypothetical issue became a reality in the 2009 Burlington, 
Vermont, mayoral election when Bob Kiss won despite being neither the plurality winner nor 
the Condorcet victor.153 
Another potential drawback of IRV is that it could limit the representation of third-party 
candidates and ideological minorities within a party. Under the current system, candidates may 
need to make concessions or appeals to third-party voters and ideological minorities in order to 
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IRV, however, third-party candidates and candidates representing ideological minorities would 
likely be eliminated in early tabulations, and voters who ranked them first would have their 
votes go to their second-choice candidate, reducing the need for candidates to seriously 
consider those voters’ policy preferences.154 
But the potential downsides of IRV are outweighed by its numerous advantages. The primary 
benefit is the possibility of electing consensus candidates who appeal to a broader range of the 
electorate and reducing fracturing within the party. Most importantly, IRV would reduce the 
risk of vote splitting, which could lead to the nomination of a candidate who has only won a 
plurality of votes and who the majority of voters disfavor. Additionally, IRV can increase voter 
turnout, which would help lead to the election of a more representative nominee. IRV also has 
been shown to lead to greater civility and less negative campaigning between primary 
candidates. A candidate who runs a negative campaign is less likely to be a secondary or tertiary 
preference of opposing candidates’ supporters, helping the party ultimately unify and rally 
around the eventual nominee.155 IRV could push candidates to focus on the entire electorate, 
rather than running campaigns focused on their core supporters.156 IRV has already been 
implemented in major elections in several states, such as Nevada, and in many city council and 
mayoral elections, with promising results.157   
 Balancing the Input of Voters and Party Establishments 
There are several ways elite party members can influence the outcome of primaries. Mayors, 
governors, members of the House of Representatives, senators, influential donors, and other 
party insiders can use endorsements, fundraising, and other tactics to shape primary elections. 
Additionally, the Democratic and Republican parties permit elected officials from their parties 
and other established party members to vote as “superdelegates,” whose votes give the party 
establishments a role in the selection of presidential nominees. Because it is unlikely that party 
elites would support an unelectable, unqualified, extremist candidate, superdelegates help 
ensure that the parties select candidates who are qualified and represent the parties’ 
platforms. But superdelegates’ role may make it more difficult for a representative candidate 
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Depending on the rules the parties use, superdelegates can drastically reduce the role of voters 
in the selection of presidential nominees.158 Under the rules the Democratic Party used in 2016, 
superdelegates were permitted to “pledge” to support a candidate prior to the Democratic 
National Convention.159 Supporters of candidate Bernie Sanders repeatedly called the 2016 
system “undemocratic,” citing, for example, the 2016 New Hampshire primary. In that contest, 
Sanders won over 60 percent of the popular vote, and Clinton received 38 percent.160 New 
Hampshire had 24 pledged delegates, which were awarded based on the popular vote, and six 
elected officials voting as superdelegates.161 All six superdelegates voted for Clinton.162 Even 
though Sanders won 55,000 more popular votes than Clinton, Sanders and Clinton each 
received 15 delegates from the New Hampshire primary.163 
Following the 2016 election and outrage from Sanders and his supporters, the Democratic 
National Committee voted, nearly unanimously, to prevent superdelegates from voting at the 
2020 Democratic National Convention, unless no candidate received a majority of the pledged 
delegates to the convention during the presidential primaries and caucuses.164 The rule change 
is intended to give the voters, not elected officials and other party elites, the ultimate say in 
selecting a presidential nominee.165  
1. Existing Proposals 
Existing proposals for increasing peer review, which refers to the parties’ ability to impact 
nominee selection, include pre-primary endorsements and pre-primary votes of confidence. 
Pre-primary endorsements and pre-primary votes of confidence would involve a party 
convention held in January of an election year for the party establishment to weigh in on their 
prospective presidential candidates. In the pre-primary endorsement model, the candidate with 
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least 15 percent of votes would be precluded from appearing on the primary ballot.166 A pre-
primary vote of confidence would have the party take a less decisive role. It would allow the 
party to interview the candidates to determine if they were adequately qualified and whether 
their ideals corresponded with those of the party.167 Party members could also evaluate 
whether each candidate was capable of fulfilling the obligations of the presidency.168 Unlike the 
pre-primary endorsement model, however, candidates who did not meet the threshold could 
still appear on the parties’ primary ballot, giving the voters, rather than the party, the final say. 
But the parties would still have discretion to exclude candidates from the debates, which could 
severely hinder a candidate’s campaign.169  
2. Our Recommendation: Superdelegate Reform 
We endorse the Democratic Party’s pre-2020 superdelegate reform because it strikes a sensible 
balance between the party’s discretion and the influence of voters. As discussed, the reform 
only allows superdelegates to vote at the Democratic National Convention if no candidate 
receives a majority of pledged votes through states’ primaries and caucuses.170 If no candidate 
secures a majority of votes, all delegates become unbound, and superdelegates may exert 
some influence in selecting a candidate who the party believes is representative, qualified, and 
able to prevail in a general election.   
Critics of peer review typically object to replacing the voice of the voters with the voice of party 
officials, and the 2016 presidential primaries demonstrated that superdelegates may exert so 
much influence on presidential primaries that they effectively take the vote away from the 
people. Nonetheless, it is appropriate for established party leaders and party members to play 
a role in selecting a presidential candidate if primary voters are unable to reach a majority 
consensus. Superdelegates can also make it more difficult for an unelectable extremist 
candidate to become the party’s nominee, and they can guarantee that a party’s presidential 
nominee has some party-wide support. Superdelegates should, however, only play a role in 
selecting a presidential nominee after all the states have voted and pledged delegates have 
been assigned. The voters should have the first say in selecting a representative and qualified 
presidential nominee and, if no candidate has received a majority of pledged delegates, then 
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III. Implementing Reform 
Currently states run their own primaries and political parties run caucuses. However, this 
system sows competition between states, even though the competition should be between the 
candidates. Because states and state political parties can determine the method and date of 
their respective presidential candidate selection process, states are encouraged to battle each 
other to the front of the calendar and determine their own rules for voting. Because our 
proposed reforms are extensive and would likely disadvantage some states, it is unlikely that 
states will willingly agree to surrender their autonomy in this process. Our reforms would not 
have their intended effects unless every state implemented them. This Part explores the 
potential for a unified, national implementation of our recommendations through 
congressional action or pressure from national political parties. 
 Implementation by National Parties  
The national political parties should encourage their state parties to implement the reforms 
uniformly. National parties’ ability to control their state and local parties is limited. But if the 
national parties are not satisfied with the way state parties run their presidential nominating 
conventions, the national parties may refuse to recognize the delegates those state parties 
send to the Republican National Convention or the Democratic National Convention.171 It is in 
each major political party’s interest to promote the selection of electable, qualified, and 
representative presidential nominees.  
1. Congressional Action  
Congress has authority to regulate national elections under the Constitution’s Article II.172 First, 
Congress has the power to determine the time and day on which presidential electors are 
chosen.173 Second, Congress has the power to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of 
elections for senators and representatives in Congress.174 In 1976, the Supreme Court held in 
Buckley v. Valeo that “Congress has power to regulate Presidential elections and primaries.”175 
Even before Buckley, various Supreme Court cases confirmed Congress’ broad power to 
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In Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, petitioners, who had failed to comply with 
bookkeeping requirements of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, challenged Congress’s 
authority to regulate presidential elections.177 The Court disagreed with plaintiff’s contention, 
and held that it was critical for Congress to have some authority to regulate presidential 
elections.178 In the majority opinion, Justice Sutherland wrote:  
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to 
safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the 
result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection. 
Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses every other 
power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general 
government from impairment or destruction . . .179 
The Court confirmed Congress’s authority to regulate primary elections a few years later, in 
United States v. Classic.180 Where primary elections are integral to the selection of a candidate 
in the general election, the Court held that congressional authority over the general election 
includes the authority to regulate primaries.181 The Court extended its constitutional 
interpretation of Congress’ authority over presidential elections in Oregon v. Mitchell;182 citing 
Classic, the Court stated that the authority “to enact the numerous requirements as to 
procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the [the 
right to vote]” was “augmented” by the Necessary and Proper Clause.183  
There are, of course, counterarguments to the contention that Congress has the authority to 
regulate presidential primaries, namely that congressional action would interfere with the 
parties’ First Amendment right to political association.184 In considering the parties’ right to 
political association, courts would look to whether there is a compelling interest that outweighs 
this right.185 Some compelling interests might include “protecting the opportunity of voters in 
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candidates to compete for the presidency, and preserving the legitimacy of the office, the 
electoral process, and the political system.”186 
IV. Conclusion 
The president leads the entire country, not merely the states he or she won in the election or 
factions of his or her political party. Furthermore, presidents must have the qualifications 
needed to effectively discharge the office’s responsibilities. Accordingly, our recommendations 
aim to reform the primaries to allow the parties to nominate the most representative and 
qualified candidates as possible.  
The primary calendar reform aims to give each state a more equal say in selecting nominees, 
rather than allowing some early voting states to set the trajectory for the race while leaving 
later voting states out of the equation. Reforming debates would create an effective platform 
to inform the public. The elimination of caucuses and opening of primaries to independent 
voters would ensure that those who want to support candidates for the nomination can have 
their voices heard. The IRV proposal would make primary nominees respond to a broader swath 
of the electorate and unify their party, rather than doubling down on appealing to their core 
supporters. The superdelegate reform would allow the party establishments to still play a 
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